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THE CASE AGAINST SECRET SETTLEMENTS
(OR, WHAT YOU DON'T KNOW CAN
HURT YOU)
Richard A. Zitrin*
I. THE THESIS AND THE RULE
Plaintiffs' lawyers, at least the best ones, are believers in their
causes. They're convinced that part of their job is to expose cars that
don't steer right or blow up under certain conditions, drugs with danger-
ous side effects, or clergymen and scoutmasters who molest kids.
Defense lawyers, at least the best ones, are dedicated to bringing justice
to their clients. They're committed to beating back frivolous claims and
plaintiffs with victim complexes, but when legitimate cases come along,
they try to settle them quickly and fairly-and in a way that won't create
more innocent victims.
Unfortunately, the laws in the vast majority of states combine with
the ethics rules in every state to prevent lawyers on both sides from
achieving these goals. Because the rules of ethics generally require put-
ting the interests of the client ahead of those of society, lawyers are
bound to settle cases in ways which serve the needs of the specific clients
while potentially harming the interests of society as a whole. Unless
counsel is operating in one of the very few states with strong "sunshine
in litigation" laws', there is little that can be done when the defendant
demands, and the plaintiff accepts, secrecy as a condition of resolving a
case.
It is for this reason that I propose that American Bar Association
Model Rule of Professional Conduct 3.2 be amended to add section (B),
as follows (new portions of the rule are italicized):
* Partner in Zitrin & Mastromonaco, LLP in San Francisco; Adjunct Professor of Law and
Coordinator of Ethics Curriculum University of San Francisco. The author thanks Carol M.
Langford and the Ballantine Publishing Group for the use of material published in Chapter 9 of
RicHARD ZrrIN & CAROL M. LANGFORD, THE MORAL CowAss OF THE AMERicAN LAWYER (1999).
1. Among such laws or rules-not all of which can be seen as either strong or effective-are
the following: DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 17 §5(g); FLA. CODE ANN. §69.081(West 1998); LA. CODE CIv.
PRoc. art. 1426(1998); Mich. Ct. Rule 8.105; N.J. Ct. Rules §1:2-1 & § 4:10-3; N.C. GEN. STAT.
§132-1.3; OPRE. STAT. §30.4; TEx. RuL.Es CIv. PRoc. ANN. §76(a); VA. CODE ANN. §8.01-420.1;
and Wash. State House Bill 1866 "Public Right to Know Bill" (1993).
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RULE 3.2 EXPEDITING LITIGATION AND LIMITATIONS
(A) A lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation
consistent with the interests of the client.
(B) A lawyer shall not participate in offering or making an
agreement, whether in connection with a lawsuit or otherwise, to pre-
vent or restrict the availability to the public of information that the
lawyer reasonably believes directly concerns a substantial danger to
the public health or safety, or to the health or safety of any particular
individual(s).
Comment
1. Dilatory practices bring the administration of justice into disre-
pute. Delay should not be indulged merely for the convenience of
the advocates, or for the purpose of frustrating an opposing
party's attempt to obtain rightful redress or repose. It is not a justi-
fication that similar conduct is often tolerated by the bench and
bar. The question is whether a competent lawyer acting in good
faith would regard the course of action as having some substantial
purpose other than delay. Realizing financial or other benefit from
otherwise improper delay in litigation is not a legitimate interest
of the client.
2. Some settlements have been facilitated by agreements to limit the
public's access to information obtained both by investigation and
through the discovery process. However, the public's interest in
being free from substantial dangers to health and safety requires
that no agreement that prevents disclosure to the public of infor-
mation that directly affects that health and safety may be permit-
ted. This includes agreements or stipulations to protective orders
that would prevent the disclosure of such information. It also pre-
cludes a lawyer seeking discovery from concurring in efforts to
seek such orders where the discovery sought is reasonably likely
to include information covered by subsection (B) of the rule.
However, in the event a court enters a lawful and final protective
order without the parties' agreement thereto, subsection (B) shall
not require the disclosure of the information subject to that order.
3. Subsection (B) does not require the disclosure of the amount of
any settlement. Further, in the event of a danger to any particular
individual(s) under Subsection (B), the rule is intended to require
only that the availability of information about the danger not be
restricted from any persons reasonably likely to be affected, and
from any governmental regulatory or oversight agencies that
would have a substantial interest in that danger. In such
instances, the rule is not intended to permit disclosure to persons
not affected by the dangers.
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Drafter's (Author's) Note:
The language in the first phrase of part (B) is taken from that
used in Rule 5.6, on restricting a lawyer's practice. The language
"reasonably believes" parallels that used in Rule 1.6. The use of the
phrase "substantial danger to the public health or safety," rather than
the more restrictive language of Rule 1.6 ("imminent death or sub-
stantial bodily harm") is used here because the matters disclosed in
the discovery process are not ordinarily protected by confidentiality
under Rule 1.6, and also because the use of the term "imminent" is
not consistent with the practical exigencies of dangers which may be
inevitable but have a longer than imminent incubation period.
This is the first published draft of this rule. My intention here is
neither to defend the exact wording of the draft, nor to suggest that this is
the only way, or even the best way, to craft a rule. Rather, it is my hope
that this draft might serve as a starting point for discussion. The purpose
of this paper - and the presentation I gave at Hofstra-is to make three
points: first, that secrecy in settlements is an important problem that car-
ries with it a significant potential of danger to the public; second, that
regulatory intervention is necessary to prevent this harm; and third, that
"sunshine" legislation, while undoubtedly a step in the right direction, is
not an adequate remedy to protect legitimate public interests.
II. SECRET SETTLEMENTS ARE DANGEROUS
A. Professor Miller and the Arguments in Favor of Secrecy
There are many lawyers, plaintiffs' and defense counsel alike, who
simply believe that secrecy is necessary to the way civil litigation is prac-
ticed in this country-without the ability to settle in a way that keeps
damaging information from public scrutiny, the incentive to settle would
be lost.' Others, significant among them Professor Arthur R. Miller of
Harvard, consider the courts to be places which serve "private parties
bringing a private dispute."'3 "Litigants do not give up their privacy rights
simply because they have walked, voluntarily or involuntarily, through
2. See, e.g., the discussions in Arthur R. Miller, Confidentiality, Protective Orders, and
Public Access to the Courts, 105 HARv. L. REv. 427, 486-7 (1991); and Wayne D. Brazil, Protecting
the Confidentiality of Settlement Negotiations, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 955, 958-9 (1988). In addition,
there are a large number of informal discussions, essays, forums, and "op-ed" pieces which have
raised this issue. Most recently, at the American Bar Association's Center for Professional
Responsibility's annual conference in May 1998, two of four members of a plenary panel I
moderated on this issue (Lewis Goldfarb of Chrysler Corp. and David W. Rudy, a mediator based in
San Francisco and Colorado Springs, CO) strongly advocated for the need to preserve secrecy in
order to facilitate the settlement process.
3. Miller, supra note 2, at 464-6.
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the courthouse door," argues Miller. No plaintiff, just by paying a court
filing fee, should be able to force a defendant to disclose "intensely per-
sonal and confidential information."4 This focus on privacy rights is
generally coupled with a broad view of the use of protective orders, one
which encompasses, in the words of the federal rule, avoiding "annoy-
ance" and "embarrassment," as well as undue burden or expense.5
Proponents see a third reason for advancing secrecy in court pro-
ceedings. Parties, especially large corporations targeted for their "deep
pockets," should not be subject to frivolous lawsuits based on other friv-
olous lawsuits and the stories that grow out of them. Again, Professor
Miller states:
"Is it true that protective orders and court seals keep information
regarding public health and safety hidden? Thus far, assertions to that
effect have been supported primarily by anecdotal evidence; research
or statistical data is completely nonexistent. An examination of sev-
eral of the stories that have surfaced during the debate demonstrates
that they are of questionable content .. ."6
B. Debunking the Need for Secrecy
Superficially, all these reasons seem logical. It makes intuitive
sense that it will be more difficult for a plaintiff to settle a case with a
defendant if the defendant knows that it is no longer allowed to protect
the dangerous practice it engages in behind a secret veil. But there are
no empirical studies or even "anecdotal" evidence indicating that it is
actually harder to attain a settlement when secrecy is not permitted. In
those states that have developed the strongest anti-secrecy regulations7,
there has been no indication of a resulting court logjam, or even that
settlement rates have gone down. Therefore, it is reasonable to speculate
that the amount of settlement may decrease somewhat when there is no
premium paid for secrecy. But settlements, secret or not, rarely involve
admissions of wrongdoing. Parties who don't want their conduct
exposed still have substantial incentive to settle before the heightened
scrutiny of a trial.
4. Id. at 466.
5. Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 26(c).
6. Miller, supra note 2, at 479.
7. I consider these to be Texas, Washington, and Florida (see discussion infra).
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While Professor Miller and others see courts as fora for the resolu-
tion of private disputes,8 the contrary view, expressed here by Ralph
Nader, makes more sense: "America's courts are public, not private,
institutions. Secrecy agreements undermine the public's right to know."9
Texas Congressman Lloyd Doggett, who while a state Supreme Court
judge was the architect of Texas Rule 76(a), one of the strongest anti-
secrecy regulations, put it this way: "To close a court to public scrutiny
of the proceedings is to shut off the light of the law."" ° Moreover, per-
sonifying corporations by ascribing to them "intensely personal" feel-
ings-including annoyance and embarrassment-stretches credulity.
To a significant extent, the debate about secrecy in the courts has
been more of a philosophical and political issue than a matter of legal
ethics. The third claim raised by Miller-that there is inadequate infor-
mation on which to base a need for openness-seems to be both the most
politicized and the least supportable.
It's true, of course, that "anecdotes" and "stories" don't, in and of
themselves, prove anything, any more than do mere allegations in a law-
suit. Nor does an isolated settlement, which a company may enter into in
order to protect itself from the publicity of going to trial. Even an occa-
sional jury verdict doesn't prove a product is defective in every case,
only in that particular one. But neither Professor Miller nor the Product
Liability Defense Council, whose members are companies sued for
defective products and whose foundation helped finance Miller's work,
are able to point to any evidence of their own that open settlements actu-
ally encourage frivolous lawsuits.
More significantly, an examination of some "stories" about danger-
ous conditions reveals far more than mere "anecdotes." These few
examples are by no means intended as an exhaustive list:
* Zomax. Public disclosure came only after a scientist experienced a
potentially fatal allergic reaction and decided to investigate. The drug
was eventually taken off the market, but by that time, it was report-
edly responsible for a dozen deaths and over 400 severe allergic reac-
tions, almost all of which were kept quiet through secret settlements
worked out by McNeil, the drug's manufacturer.11
8. Prof. Miller is not alone. Mediators are generally trained to see disputes as private, a view
strongly expressed by Mr. Rudy at the ABA Center for Professional Responsibility Conference
referred to supra note 2.
9. Nader quoted in Robert Costello, What You Don't Know Can Hurt You, MASS. LAW
WKLY., Feb. 20, 1995.
10. Lloyd Doggett & Michael Mucchetti, Public Access to Public Courts, 69 TFX. L. REv.
643, 653 (1991).
11. See McNeilab, Inc., v. HHS, No. 84-1617 (D.D.C. June 5, 1985). See also supra note 10.
1999]
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" Dalkon Shield: This product was taken off the American market, but
only after numerous secret settlements which left the public in the
dark long after the dangers of the product were known to those
involved in the litigation. Indeed, attorneys for A.H. Robbins, the
Shield's manufacturer, even tried to condition settlements on the
plaintiffs' lawyers' promises never to take another Dalkon case.12
" Halcion, Shiley Heart Valve: Both products were removed from the
American market after cases were secretly settled, but only with the
help of outside sources - in Halcion's case, evidence from England,
in the valve's case, a Congressional investigative committee.1 3
* General Motors pick-ups with side-mounted gas tanks: These tanks
were the subject of much litigation, including a suit by GM's lawyers
against Ralph Nader and the Center for Auto Safety. Discovery in
that suit produced GM records showing 245 cases filed nationwide
alleging a dangerous defect. The actual number settled is difficult to
determine because of secrecy agreements, but estimates of the
number of settled cases range from 50 to over 200; almost all required
that the information be kept secret from anyone not a party to a spe-
cific case. 4
It is difficult to believe that the settlement of hundreds of lawsuits
involving dangerous drugs or gas tanks causing fires result merely from
unsupported individual claims. There is a point beyond which "anecdo-
tal evidence" takes on a clear pattern. Where that pattern points to the
existence of a danger to the public health and safety-or even the serious
possibility of such a danger-it is time to ask whether our legal system
can afford to allow such secrecy. Not only does suppressing evidence
deny information to the public, but it unbalances the scales between
plaintiffs and defendants. Only by exploring the evidence for themselves
can both plaintiffs and government regulators fairly assess how those
possibilities affect them.
12. MORTON Mnrz, AT ANY COST 197-8 (1985).
13. See, e.g., Bob Gibbins, Secrecy Versus Safety: Restoring the Balance, 77 ABA J. 74
(1991) and STEVEN D. LYDENBERG ET. AL., RATING AMERICA'S CORPORATE CONSCIENCE: A
PROVOCATIVE GUIDE TO THE CoMPANEs BEFmD THE PRODUCTS You Buy EVERYDAY 234 (1986).
14. Author correspondence and interviews with Clarence Ditlow, Director of Center for Auto
Safety, especially June 23, 1997; see Transcript of American Judicature Society, "Confidential
Settlements and Sealed Court Records: Necessary Safeguards or Unwarranted Secrecy?" reported in
78 JUDICATURE 304, and especially at 311 (1995); Catherine Yang, A Disturbing Trend Toward
Secrecy, Bus. WK., October 2, 1995, at 60. Discovery of GM incident lists obtained from the Center
for Auto Safety lists 245 closed cases.
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One highly publicized matter, the breast implant case of Maria
Stern, 15 whose settlement included a promise to keep key documents
secret, has aroused a great deal of controversy. Many believe that sili-
cone breast implants cause various connective tissue and other such dis-
eases. Others clearly do not.16 But the more important issue is that
members of the public, and, indeed, even the Food & Drug Administra-
tion, were unable to decide this issue for themselves. Even Dr. Marcia
Angell, whose book strongly criticized those who argued that implants
were dangerous, could only say that the "secret documents" discovered
by Stem's lawyers, "revealing as they were, did not yield a smoking
gun.""7 The failure to reveal a smoking gun is hardly a justification for
keeping the information secret.
C. Beyond Mere Secrecy
Unfortunately, courthouse secrecy doesn't stop with protective
orders, sealing discovery, or returning it to the other side. The center-
piece of my presentation at Hofstra was the Fentress case, tried in Louis-
ville in late 1994. Although the case went to a jury, the verdict was
tainted, if not completely fraudulent, because of an agreement between
plaintiffs' and defense counsel that the plaintiffs would withhold certain
evidence in return for what was described as "tremendous" sums of
money. '8 I personally have been involved, as an expert witness, in a case
where the name of the law firm was deleted from the record upon settle-
ment so no one would be able to tell from docket and court files what
particular law firm and attorneys had been sued. I, too, am bound by
secrecy, though not of my own choosing and, thus, can't cite the case
name here.
In California, litigants on appeal can agree to "de-publish" court
opinions, a stipulation that often comes about as a condition of a post-
trial settlement. Even worse is the practice, not permitted in federal
courts, of allowing parties to agree to a "stipulated reversal." The appel-
late court reverses an adverse trial judgment, when asked to do so, by
15. Stern v. Dow Coming Corp.,1987 U.S. App. LEXms 6517 (9th Cir. 1987); see, e.g.,
discussions in RICHARD ZrrRIN & CAROL M. LANGFORD, THE MORAL COMPASS OF THE AmRicAN
LAWYER ch. 9 (1999); RALPH NADER & WESLEY J. SMrrH, No CONTEST (1996).
16. See Marcia Angell, M.D., SCIENCE ON TRIAL (1996). Dr. Angell was executive editor of
The New England Journal of Medicine.
17. Id. at 60.
18. See ZrrRN AND LANoFORD supra note 15, at 193-203. The Fentress case was the subject
of an extensive series of articles in the Louisville CouER-JouRNAL by reporter Leslie Scanlon, as
well as being reported by the New Jersey LAW JOURNAL and the Indianapolis STAR, although the
story was otherwise largely ignored by the press.
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stipulation of the parties, making it appear that the adverse finding had
been set aside when it really was settled out of existence.' 9 One Califor-
nia appellate court justice, J. Anthony Kline, was so offended by this
technique that he wrote a dissent stating his refusal to follow this rule.2 °
All of these matters go beyond mere secrecy by overtly misleading
the public. They are, or rather should be, intolerable. Yet there are pres-
sures, including from clients who reap substantial rewards, to engage in
these deceptions. It is here, with these deceptions and the stipulated
efforts of opposing counsel, that legislative and court-imposed solutions
fail. But they could succeed if coupled with a new ethics rule.
I. COURT, LEGISLATIVE, AND ETHICAL SOLUTIONS
Since 1990, about a dozen states have adopted some prohibition on
keeping secrets from the public. Some states' laws are limited and weak,
but a few have real teeth. One is Florida's 1990 Sunshine in Litigation
Act, which directly prevents secret settlements and secrecy orders that
conceal information about "public hazards," a phrase the legislature
defined broadly. In 1993, Washington State passed a similar law, the
"Public Right to Know Bill."
In Texas, Congressman Doggett's efforts led to Texas Rule 76(a),
passed by the court in 1990 by a 4-3 vote, which broadly prohibits secret
agreements. The rule starts with a presumption that all court records
must be open. No judge may seal something from public view, even if
the lawyers for both sides agree, unless the judge finds that a "specific,
serious and substantial interest" needs protection, and that secrecy is the
only way to accomplish it.
Texas's rule has three other important components. First, it covers
not just the usual court records and proceedings, but all documents,
whether filed with the court or merely given to the other side during
discovery. Second, court orders and opinions can never be sealed, so the
names can never be changed, or the decision "depublished." Third,
secrecy orders can be challenged not just by the parties but by anyone,
including the press and consumer groups. But while both the Texas rule
and the Florida and Washington laws have great strengths, they also have
significant weaknesses. Most significantly, they still must depend on
19. Neary v. Regents of Univ. of California, 3 Cal. 4th 273 (1992).
20. Morrow v. Hood Communications, Inc., 59 Cal. App. 4th 924 (1997). Kline was charged
with violating judicial ethics for writing his dissent, though he said he would obey a specific order of
his state's Supreme Court if told to do so. The matter is pending before the state's judicial
performance commission at this article's deadline.
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individual judges willing to take strong stands. Many judges, focused on
encouraging settlement, see secrecy as being the easiest path to that goal.
More important, neither Texas, Florida nor Washington directly
addressed the behavior of lawyers. Nothing prevents Texas plaintiffs'
and defense counsel from working together to convince a judge that their
case is that rare one where secrecy is needed. Florida prohibits secrecy
agreements between attorneys, but has no specific penalties. Parties who
enter into secrecy agreements in Washington are liable for violating con-
sumer protection laws, but it still doesn't directly punish the lawyers.
This puts lawyers from both sides right where they have always been -
in the position of vigorously representing their clients while putting aside
the needs of the public.
In 1991, the California legislature considered Senate Bill 711,21 a
far-reaching proposal that would have made secrecy orders and agree-
ments illegal in cases concerning defective products, environmental
hazards, and financial frauds. The bill passed both houses of the legisla-
ture, but was vetoed by Governor Pete Wilson. California Senate Bill
711 included a provision that would actually have disciplined lawyers
who engaged in secret settlements.
This statute had the right idea. If an ethical rule required that attor-
neys could no longer put their clients' interests ahead of the public health
and safety in specific kinds of cases, lawyers would be less likely to
stipulate their way around "sunshine" laws. Until then, many will insist
that it is their affirmative ethical duty to do this, even where the public is
at risk. And innocent people will suffer as a result.
21. Calif. S.B. 711 (Lockyer), 1991.
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